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Regulating Market Language: Market Failure in Descriptive Signals

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  • Andrew Stivers

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  • Andrew Stivers, 2009. "Regulating Market Language: Market Failure in Descriptive Signals," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 23-41, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jcopol:v:32:y:2009:i:1:p:23-41
    DOI: 10.1007/s10603-009-9091-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
    5. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring.
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    7. Rosemary Avery & Donald Kenkel & Dean Lillard & Alan Mathios, 2007. "Regulating advertisements: the case of smoking cessation products," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 185-208, April.
    8. Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, 1994. "Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 45-64, Fall.
    9. Levin, Irwin P. & Johnson, Richard D. & Russo, Craig P. & Deldin, Patricia J., 1985. "Framing effects in judgment tasks with varying amounts of information," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 362-377, December.
    10. Solomon, Michael R, 1983. "The Role of Products as Social Stimuli: A Symbolic Interactionism Perspective," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 10(3), pages 319-329, December.
    11. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    12. Bonini, Nicolao & Biel, Anders & Garling, Tommy & Karlsson, Niklas, 2002. "Influencing what the money is perceived to be worth: Framing and priming in contingent valuation studies," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 655-663, October.
    13. Charles Noussair & StÈphane Robin & Bernard Ruffieux, 2004. "Do Consumers Really Refuse To Buy Genetically Modified Food?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 102-120, January.
    14. Elizabeth G. Miller & Barbara E. Kahn, 2005. "Shades of Meaning: The Effect of Color and Flavor Names on Consumer Choice," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 32(1), pages 86-92, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Trenton G. Smith & Attila Tasnádi, 2014. "The Economics of Information, Deep Capture, and the Obesity Debate," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(2), pages 533-541.
    2. Smith, Trenton G. & Chouinard, Hayley H. & Wandschneider, Philip R., 2011. "Waiting for the invisible hand: Novel products and the role of information in the modern market for food," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 239-249, April.
    3. Ehmke, Mariah Dolsen & Bonanno, Alessandro & Boys, Kathryn & Smith, Trenton G., 2019. "Food fraud: economic insights into the dark side of incentives," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 63(4), October.

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