An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9520-9
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"Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks,"
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- Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew, 2016. "Liquidity Risk in Sequential Trading Networks," Working Paper Series 16-039, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018. "Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks," Scholarly Articles 35165081, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- March, Christoph, 2021. "Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
- Ulrich Bergmann & Arkady Konovalov, 2024. "Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 36-57, March.
- Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022. "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 45-55, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Auctions; Endogenous budget constraint; Principal-agent problem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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