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Justin Ellis Burkett

Personal Details

First Name:Justin
Middle Name:Ellis
Last Name:Burkett
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbu497
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://justin.burkett.cc

Affiliation

School of Economics
Georgia Institute of Technology

Atlanta, Georgia (United States)
http://www.econ.gatech.edu/
RePEc:edi:segatus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020. "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  2. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2019. "Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 227-246.
  3. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2018. "Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 1-15.
  4. Burkett, Justin, 2018. "Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 22-26.
  5. Justin Burkett & Francis X. Flanagan & Amanda L. Griffith, 2018. "Allocating group housing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 581-596, April.
  6. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017. "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 973-1006, December.
  7. Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  8. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
  9. Justin Burkett, 2006. "How Much Will People Pay for Status?," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 50(1), pages 80-87, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020. "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Kirkegaard, René, 2021. "Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    2. Peyman Khezr & Anne Cumpston, 2022. "A review of multiunit auctions with homogeneous goods," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 1225-1247, September.
    3. Shiying Chen & Zhenhuan Dong & Chunming Cao & Changjun Zheng, 2022. "Strategy and design of multi‐unit auction in grouped asymmetric setting," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3435-3453, December.

  2. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2019. "Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 227-246.

    Cited by:

    1. Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Papers 2009.12114, arXiv.org.
    2. Tierney, Ryan, 2022. "Incentives And Efficiency In Matching With Transfers: Towards Nonquasilinear Package Auctions," Discussion Papers on Economics 6/2022, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    3. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

  3. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2018. "Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 1-15.

    Cited by:

    1. Simon Finster, 2020. "Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions," Economics Papers 2020-W03, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    2. Kirkegaard, René, 2021. "Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    3. Khezr, Peyman & Pourkhanali, Armin, 2023. "An investigation of auctions in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," MPRA Paper 119289, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Cumpston, Anne & Khezr, Peyman, 2020. "Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature," MPRA Paper 101336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2021. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Ahead of .
    6. Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2020. "Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    7. Qunwei Wang & Cheng Cheng & Dequn Zhou, 2020. "Multi-round auctions in an emissions trading system considering firm bidding strategies and government regulations," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 25(7), pages 1403-1421, October.
    8. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.

  4. Justin Burkett & Francis X. Flanagan & Amanda L. Griffith, 2018. "Allocating group housing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 581-596, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal, 2019. "Matching with partners and projects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

  5. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017. "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 973-1006, December.

    Cited by:

    1. March, Christoph, 2019. "The behavioral economics of artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players," BERG Working Paper Series 154, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    2. Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018. "Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks," Scholarly Articles 35165081, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    3. March, Christoph, 2021. "Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Ulrich Bergmann & Arkady Konovalov, 2024. "Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 36-57, March.
    5. Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022. "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 45-55, December.

  6. Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle, 2020. "Money burning in the theory of delegation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 382-412.
    2. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2019. "Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 611-632.
    3. Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018. "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 20-40.
    4. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020. "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    5. Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2018. "Selling to a naive agent with two rationales," Discussion Papers 18-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    6. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017. "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 973-1006, December.
    7. Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej Henryk & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018. "Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks," Scholarly Articles 35165081, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    8. Hummel, Patrick, 2017. "Endogenous budget constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 11-15.
    9. Ghosh, Gagan, 2021. "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 75-93.

  7. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2020. "Contracting Under Unverifiable Monetary Costs," Post-Print hal-02866383, HAL.
    2. Burkett, Justin, 2016. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    3. Marianne Fay & David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2021. "Funding and financing infrastructure: the joint-use of public and private finance," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03166092, HAL.
    4. Zhonghao Shui, 2023. "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 925-951, September.
    5. Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018. "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 20-40.
    6. Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022. "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Discussion Papers 22-02, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    7. Nicolas Quérou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2015. "Moral hazard and capability," Working Papers hal-02795218, HAL.
    8. Sano, Ryuji, 2023. "Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    9. Debasis Mishra & Kolagani Paramahamsa, 2022. "Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent," Papers 2202.10378, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    10. Selcuk, Cemil, 2017. "Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 262-285.
    11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Justin E. Burkett & Emel Filiz-Ozbay, 2017. "An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(4), pages 973-1006, December.
    12. Nicolas Querou & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2015. "Motivating versus Funding," Working Papers 15-11, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2015.
    13. Richter, Michael, 2019. "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 30-47.
    14. Hummel, Patrick, 2017. "Endogenous budget constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 11-15.
    15. Baisa, Brian & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2016. "Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 162-165.
    16. Foster Joshua, 2018. "Wars of Attrition with Endogenously Determined Budget Constraints," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-10, July.

  8. Justin Burkett, 2006. "How Much Will People Pay for Status?," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 50(1), pages 80-87, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Solnick, Sara J. & Hemenway, David, 2009. "Do spending comparisons affect spending and satisfaction?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 568-573, August.

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