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Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

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  • Jason Shogren
  • Thomas Crocker

Abstract

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Shogren & Thomas Crocker, 1991. "Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 195-214, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:1:y:1991:i:2:p:195-214
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00310018
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    1. Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, 1999. "Materials, Capital, Direct/Indirect Substitution, and Mass Balance Production Functions," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 75(4), pages 547-561.
    2. Antoci, Angelo & Borghesi, Simone, 2012. "Preserving or escaping? On the welfare effects of environmental self-protective choices," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 248-254.
    3. François Salanié & Nicolas Treich, 2020. "Public and private incentives for self-protection," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 45(2), pages 104-113, September.
    4. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/111, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    5. Antoci, Angelo, 2009. "Environmental degradation as engine of undesirable economic growth via self-protection consumption choices," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1385-1397, March.
    6. Ngo Van Long, 2023. "Saving Household Production-Cum-Consumption Time: Implications for International Trade in Trash," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 58(1), pages 15-37, February.
    7. Angelo Antoci, 2005. "Environmental Resources Depletion and Interplay Between Negative and Positive Externalities in a Growth Model," Working Papers 2005.9, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Giulio Galdi & Sergio Vergalli, 2022. "Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies with Public Effects," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 83(2), pages 313-339, October.
    9. Travis Warziniack & David Finnoff & Jonathan Bossenbroek & Jason Shogren & David Lodge, 2011. "Stepping Stones for Biological Invasion: A Bioeconomic Model of Transferable Risk," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(4), pages 605-627, December.
    10. Oh, Miyoung, 2014. "Three essays on consumer choices on food," ISU General Staff Papers 201401010800005236, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Charles Sims & David Finnoff & Jason F. Shogren, 2018. "Taking One for the Team: Is Collective Action More Responsive to Ecological Change?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(3), pages 589-615, July.
    12. James Shortle & Richard D. Horan, 2017. "Nutrient Pollution: A Wicked Challenge for Economic Instruments," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(02), pages 1-39, April.
    13. Carson Reeling & Richard D. Horan, 2018. "Economic Incentives for Managing Filterable Biological Pollution Risks from Trade," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(3), pages 651-671, July.
    14. Eli Fenichel & Timothy Richards & David Shanafelt, 2014. "The Control of Invasive Species on Private Property with Neighbor-to-Neighbor Spillovers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 59(2), pages 231-255, October.
    15. Antoci, Angelo & Borghesi, Simone & Galeotti, Marcello & Sodini, Mauro, 2021. "Living in an uncertain world: Environment substitution, local and global indeterminacy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    16. Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Antoci, Angelo & Borghesi, Simone & Galeotti, Marcello & Russu, Paolo, 2022. "Maladaptation to environmental degradation and the interplay between negative and positive externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    18. Angelo Antoci & Marcello Galeotti & Serena Sordi, 2016. "Environmental pollution as engine of industrialization," Department of Economics University of Siena 725, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    19. Anthony Heyes, 2001. "A Note on Defensive Expenditures: Harmonised Law, Diverse Results," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(3), pages 257-266, July.
    20. Antoci, Angelo & Sodini, Mauro, 2009. "Indeterminacy, bifurcations and chaos in an overlapping generations model with negative environmental externalities," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 1439-1450.
    21. Angelo Antoci & Paolo Russu & Elisa Ticci, 2022. "Modeling maladaptation in the inequality–environment nexus," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(1), pages 115-140, January.
    22. Alessandro Fiori Maccioni, 2018. "Environmental depletion, defensive consumption and negative externalities," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(2), pages 203-218, November.

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