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Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies with Public Effects

Author

Listed:
  • Angelo Antoci

    (University of Sassari)

  • Simone Borghesi

    (University of Siena and European University Institute)

  • Giulio Galdi

    (University of Siena)

  • Sergio Vergalli

    (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and University of Brescia)

Abstract

The global nature of the climatic challenge requires a high level of cooperation among agents, especially since most of the related coping strategies produce some kind of externalities toward others. Whether they are positive or negative, the presence of externalities may lead the system towards Pareto-dominated states. In this work, we study under and over-adoption of environmental adaptation technologies which enhance environmental quality for the individual while transferring externalities to other agents. We distinguish adaptation technologies between maladaptation and mitigation ones, depending on the sign of the externalities. In particular, we show that over adoption may occur for maladaptive technologies, whereas under-adoption may occur in case of mitigation. We study a model with two regions at different stages of development, which allows us to draw considerations on well-being consequences of environmental dumping.

Suggested Citation

  • Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Giulio Galdi & Sergio Vergalli, 2019. "Adoption Gaps of Environmental Adaptation Technologies with Public Effects," Working Papers 2019.14, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2019.14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Radi & Frank Westerhoff, 2024. "The green transition of firms: The role of evolutionary competition, adjustment costs, transition risk, and green technology progress," Papers 2410.20379, arXiv.org.
    2. Che, Yuyuan & Feng, Hongli & Hennessy, David A., 2023. "Will adoption occur if a practice is win-win for profit and the environment? An application to a rancher's grazing practice choices," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adaptation; Negative Externalities; Evolutionary Dynamics; Public Good Game; Environmental Dumping;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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