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A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems

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  • Halkos, George

Abstract

This paper provides a model that attempts to deal with the transboundary nature of the acid rain problem, using a game theoretic approach consistent with mainstream economic theory. The general forms of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in the explicit and implicit set-up of the model are presented under the assumptions of deterministic and stochastic deposits.

Suggested Citation

  • Halkos, George, 1994. "A game-theoretic approach to pollution control problems," MPRA Paper 33259, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33259
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33259/1/MPRA_paper_33259.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    3. Halkos, George, 1993. "An evaluation of the direct costs of abatement under the main desulphurisation technologies," MPRA Paper 32588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. George Halkos & John Hutton, "undated". "Acid Rain Games in Europe," Discussion Papers 93/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
    5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    6. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
    7. Jason Shogren & Thomas Crocker, 1991. "Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 195-214, June.
    8. Halkos, G.E., 1994. "Optimal acid rain abatement policy in Europe," MPRA Paper 33943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. George Halkos, 1994. "Optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(2), pages 127-150, April.
    10. Harrison, Glenn W & Rutstrom, E E, 1991. "Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(406), pages 420-435, May.
    11. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    12. Tahvonen Olli & Kaitala Veijo & Pohjola Matti, 1993. "A Finnish - Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. George Halkos & Christos Kitsos, 2005. "Optimal pollution level: a theoretical identification," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(13), pages 1475-1483.
    2. Halkos, George, 2000. "Determining optimal air quality standards: Quantities or prices?," MPRA Paper 42849, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; abatement cost; damage cost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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