IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ejlwec/v17y2004i1p5-19.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Karine Brisset
  • Lionel Thomas

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Karine Brisset & Lionel Thomas, 2004. "Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 5-19, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:17:y:2004:i:1:p:5-19
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1026329724892
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1026329724892
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1026329724892?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    2. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
      • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji Kawagoe, 2005. "An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Discussion papers 05003, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    2. Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2017. "EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 91-112, August.
    3. Ulrich Blum & Nicole Steinat & Michael Veltins, 2008. "On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 209-229, June.
    4. Patrice Bougette & Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2006. "L'efficacité économique des programmes de clémence," Post-Print halshs-00476807, HAL.
    5. Jun Zhou, 2016. "The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement," Working Papers 13042, Bruegel.
    6. Hamaguchi, Yasuyo & Kawagoe, Toshiji & Shibata, Aiko, 2009. "Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 145-165, March.
    7. Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Abbink, Klaus & Wu, Kevin, 2017. "Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-272.
    9. Leslie M. Marx & Claudio Mezzetti & Robert C. Marshall, 2015. "Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 205-240, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arai, Koki & Ishibashi, Ikuo & Ishii-Ishibashi, Rieko, 2011. "Research and analysis on bid rigging mechanisms," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-5, January.
    2. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2022. "Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 119-146, March.
    3. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    4. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
    5. Gärtner, D.L. & Zhou, J., 2012. "Delays in Leniency Application : Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer’s Door?," Other publications TiSEM cbb8fac0-0cd7-4a0c-a6d4-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore, 2018. "Collusion constrained equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    7. Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & Carmen García, 2014. "Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 107-136.
    8. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji Kawagoe, 2005. "An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Discussion papers 05003, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    9. Fotis, Panagiotis & Tselekounis, Markos, 2020. "Optimal Reduction of Cartel Fines induced by the Settlement Procedure," MPRA Paper 99154, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2004. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 651-673, Winter.
    11. Antonio Acconcia & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo & Patrick Rey, 2014. "Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(4), pages 1116-1159, October.
    12. Emons, Winand, 2020. "The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    13. Ulrich Blum & Nicole Steinat & Michael Veltins, 2008. "On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 209-229, June.
    14. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency policies and illegal transactions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1281-1297, August.
    15. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    16. Motchenkova, E.I. & Rus, O., 2011. "Research joint ventures and price collusion: Joint analysis of the impact of R&D subsidies and antitrust fines," Serie Research Memoranda 0025, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    17. Ankur Chavda & Marc Jegers, 2007. "The Effects Of Leniency Programs And Fines On Cartel Stability," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 231-243, May.
    18. Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
    19. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander, 2014. "Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 317-336.
    20. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2008. "Rational benevolence in small committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 139-146, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:17:y:2004:i:1:p:5-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.