An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs
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Cited by:
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- Mechtenberg, Lydia & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2017. "Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 10607, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Lydia Mechtenberg & Gerd Muehlheusser & Andreas Roider, 2017. "Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 6394, CESifo.
- Roider, Andreas & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2017. "Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ulrich Blum & Nicole Steinat & Michael Veltins, 2008. "On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 209-229, June.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Buccirossi, Paolo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2005-02-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2005-02-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-02-27 (Regulation)
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