Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities
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Other versions of this item:
- Emilie Dargaud, 2006. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Post-Print halshs-00140139, HAL.
- Emilie Dargaud, 2007. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Working Papers 0708, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Emilie Dargaud, 2007. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Post-Print halshs-00142435, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
mergers; collusion : asymmetric capacities;JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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