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The Extortion Relationship: A Computational Analysis

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  • Corinna Elsenbroich
  • Jennifer Badham

Abstract

Systematic extortion involves a long term parasitic relationship between the criminal and the victim. Game theory analysis has provided insight into the choices of individual hypothetical criminal and victim pairs. In this paper we present an agent-based model so as to extend the analysis to the relationship between extorters and other potential victims. The model is developed in two stages, the first to be closest to game theory, the second one making the decision informed by the social environment of the victim. The agent-based model shows the importance of social aspects for the functioning of extortion rackets.

Suggested Citation

  • Corinna Elsenbroich & Jennifer Badham, 2016. "The Extortion Relationship: A Computational Analysis," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 19(4), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2016-22-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jana Zausinová & Martin Zoričak & Marcel Vološin & Vladimír Gazda, 2020. "Aspects of complexity in citizen–bureaucrat corruption: an agent-based simulation model," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(2), pages 527-552, April.

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