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How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the `Ndrangheta in Northern Italy

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  • Federico Varese

Abstract

What are the conditions conducive to long-term transplantation of mafia groups in new territories? This paper systematically reviews a number of factors that facilitate such an outcome, including: migration from territories with high mafia density; the policy of forcing criminals to resettle outside their region of origin; the existence of mafia wars; two different systems of recruitment into mafia families (merit- and kin-based recruitment); the level of interpersonal trust in the new territory; and the demand for criminal protection. The paper then explores two attempts at transplantation by members of the Calabria-based mafia group `Ndrangheta to the town of Bardonecchia (Piedmont region) and to Verona (Veneto region). While the former case was successful, the latter failed. The paper concludes that features of the local economy - the presence of significant sectors of the economy unprotected by the state and a local rather than export orientation - generate a demand for criminal protection, especially protection against competition, and a demand for services of dispute settlement. Successful transplantation occurs in the presence of such a demand. Generalized migration or forced resettlement of mafiosi are not sufficient to predict transplantation. The paper shows that a high level of interpersonal trust among local law-abiding residents is not sufficient to hinder mafia transplantation, contrary to established theories of social capital and trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Varese, 2005. "How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the `Ndrangheta in Northern Italy," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _059, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:esohwp:_059
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    1. Mahoney, James & Goertz, Gary, 2004. "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 653-669, November.
    2. Lane, Frederic C., 1958. "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 401-417, December.
    3. Alastair Smith & Federico Varese, 2001. "Payment, Protection And Punishment," Rationality and Society, , vol. 13(3), pages 349-393, August.
    4. Varese, Federico, 2001. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297369.
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    1. Studer, Roman, 2008. "India and the Great Divergence: Assessing the Efficiency of Grain Markets in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century India," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 393-437, June.
    2. Jane Humphries & Tim Leunig, 2007. "Cities, Market Integration and Going to Sea: Stunting and the Standard of Living in Early Nineteenth-Century England and Wales," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _066, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Camilla Brautaset & Regina Grafe, 2006. "The Quiet Transport Revolution: Returns to scale, scope and network density in Norway's nineteenth-century sailing fleet," Oxford University Economic and Social History Series _062, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    4. J.Humphries & T. Leunig, 2007. "Cities, Market Integration and Going to Sea: Stunting and the standard of living in early nineteenth-century England and Wales," Oxford University Economic and Social History Series _066, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    5. Jacob Weisdorf & Paul Sharp, 2009. "From preventive to permissive checks: the changing nature of the Malthusian relationship between nuptiality and the price of provisions in the nineteenth century," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 3(1), pages 55-70, January.
    6. Natalia Mora-Sitja, 2006. "Exploring Changes in Earnings Inequality during Industrialization: Barcelona, 1856-1905," Economics Series Working Papers 2006-W61, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Asadullah, Mohammad Niaz, 2010. "Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947-71: Was East Pakistan Discriminated Against?," Bangladesh Development Studies, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), vol. 33(3), pages 1-46, September.
    8. Daudin, Guillaume, 2010. "Domestic Trade and Market Size in Late-Eighteenth-Century France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 716-743, September.
    9. repec:oxf:wpaper:69.2 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2002. "Cost sharing in health service provision: an empirical assessment of cost savings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 219-249, May.
    11. Regina Grafe & Camilla Brautaset, 2006. "The Quiet Transport Revolution: Returns to Scale, Scope and Network Density in Norway`s Nineteenth-Century Sailing Fleet," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _062, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. Natalia Mora-Sitja, 2006. "Exploring Changes in Earnings Inequality during Industrialization: Barcelona, 1856-1905," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _061, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    13. Asadullah, Mohammad Niaz, 2010. "Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947-71: Was East Pakistan Discriminated Against?," Bangladesh Development Studies, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), vol. 33(3), pages 1-46, September.

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