IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jeicoo/v15y2020i2d10.1007_s11403-019-00240-x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Aspects of complexity in citizen–bureaucrat corruption: an agent-based simulation model

Author

Listed:
  • Jana Zausinová

    (Technical University of Košice)

  • Martin Zoričak

    (Technical University of Košice)

  • Marcel Vološin

    (Technical University of Košice)

  • Vladimír Gazda

    (Technical University of Košice)

Abstract

In this paper, the complexity-based approach is used to analyse corruption and its internal economics and dynamics. To better understand the drivers of corruption, we employ an agent-based model with heterogeneous agents (bureaucrats and citizens), the interactions of which determine the level of corruption in a society. The emergence of a prevailing social norm of corruption is shown to be significantly influenced by the initial conditions (i.e., history and habits). A cost analysis demonstrates that a relatively limited financial investment is required for the phase transition from the corrupt to the non-corrupt state. The concept of opportunity costs is used to express the value of information shared within an agent’s social group that improves agent decision-making. Incomplete information and uncertainty in the legal system help to reduce corruption by promoting a fear of engaging in corruption in a society. The results of this research may offer useful insights for informing an effective anti-corruption policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Jana Zausinová & Martin Zoričak & Marcel Vološin & Vladimír Gazda, 2020. "Aspects of complexity in citizen–bureaucrat corruption: an agent-based simulation model," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(2), pages 527-552, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:15:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11403-019-00240-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11403-019-00240-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11403-019-00240-x
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11403-019-00240-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Roberto Pietra & Andrea Melis, 2016. "“Governance and corruption: is history repeating itself?” Fostering a debate and inviting contributions from a multidisciplinary perspective," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 689-701, December.
    4. Hokky Situngkir, 2004. "Money-Scape: A Generic Agent-Based Model of Corruption," Computational Economics 0405003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Barr, Abigail & Serra, Danila, 2010. "Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 862-869, December.
    6. Tom Baker & Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, 2003. "The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach," Discussion Paper Series dp310, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    7. Steven F. Brown & Joshua Shackman, 2007. "Corruption and Related Socioeconomic Factors: A Time Series Study," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 319-347, August.
    8. Roger Waldeck, 2016. "Modeling criminality: the impact of emotions, norms and interaction structures," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 135-160, June.
    9. Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-543, October.
    10. Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth Myles & Frank Page & Matthew Rablen, 2015. "The use of agent-based modelling to investigate tax compliance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 143-164, May.
    11. Sascha Hokamp & Michael Pickhardt, 2010. "Income Tax Evasion in a Society of Heterogeneous Agents - Evidence from an Agent-based Model," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 541-553.
    12. Litina, Anastasia & Palivos, Theodore, 2016. "Corruption, tax evasion and social values," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 164-177.
    13. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Tarek A. Hassan & Ahmed Tahoun, 2018. "The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(1), pages 1-42.
    15. Corinna Elsenbroich & Jennifer Badham, 2016. "The Extortion Relationship: A Computational Analysis," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 19(4), pages 1-8.
    16. Axel Dreher & Thomas Herzfeld, 2005. "The Economic Costs of Corruption: A Survey and New Evidence," Public Economics 0506001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Ron Martin & Peter Sunley, 2006. "Path dependence and regional economic evolution," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 395-437, August.
    18. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    19. Yushim Kim & Wei Zhong & Yongwan Chun, 2013. "Modeling Sanction Choices on Fraudulent Benefit Exchanges in Public Service Delivery," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(2), pages 1-8.
    20. Feichtinger, Gustav & Grienauer, Waltraud & Tragler, Gernot, 2002. "Optimal dynamic law enforcement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 58-69, August.
    21. Liu, Xiaoding, 2016. "Corruption culture and corporate misconduct," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 307-327.
    22. Roger Waldeck, 2013. "Segregated Cooperation," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(4), pages 1-14.
    23. Arthur, W. Brian, 2006. "Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based Modeling," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1551-1564, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
    2. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2017. "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 245-295.
    4. Arjona Trujillo, Ana María, 2002. "La corrupción política: una revisión de la literatura," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE de021404, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Wolfgang Maennig, 2004. "Korruption im internationalen Sport: ökonomische Analyse und Lösungsansätze," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 263-291.
    6. Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016. "Corruption in Russia," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
    7. Wolfgang Maennig, 2002. "On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 61-89, February.
    8. Jun Hu, 2021. "Asymmetric punishment, Leniency and Harassment Bribes in China: a selective survey," Working Papers hal-03119491, HAL.
    9. Quinteros, María José & Villena, Marcelo J. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2019. "Whistleblowing Behavior in Organizations," MPRA Paper 99215, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Nov 2019.
    10. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 377-412.
    11. Bac, Mehmet, 1998. "The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 101-120, March.
    12. van Veldhuizen, R., 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 341-356.
    13. Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2008. "Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-26, CIRANO.
    14. Maurizio Caserta & Livio Ferrante & Francesco Reito, 2022. "Bribes and Bureaucracy Size: The Strategy of Watering Down Corruption," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(353), pages 191-213, January.
    15. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. "Harassment, corruption and tax policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
    16. Raffaella Barone & Donato Masciandaro & Friedrich Schneider, 2022. "Corruption and money laundering: You scratch my back, i’ll scratch yours," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 318-342, February.
    17. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
    18. Karol Marek Klimczak & Alejo José G. Sison & Maria Prats & Maximilian B. Torres, 2022. "How to Deter Financial Misconduct if Crime Pays?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 205-222, August.
    19. Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.
    20. Fahr, René & Djawadi, Behnud Mir, 2012. "The impact of risk perception and risk attitudes on corrupt behavior: Evidence from a petty corruption experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62022, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:15:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11403-019-00240-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.