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Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development

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  • Alex Cukierman

Abstract

Monetary policy usually enables policymakers to quickly but temporarily, achieve various real goals like high employment, financing of the budget deficit, attainment of balance of payments objectives and low interest rates. In the process, high powered mo

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  • Alex Cukierman, 1993. "Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 30(91), pages 271-292.
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:30:y:1993:i:91:p:271-292
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    3. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Other publications TiSEM 0401b17a-e2c7-4179-ace9-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
    6. Helge Berger & Jakob De Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
    7. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    8. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    9. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 407-443.
    10. Fischer, S., 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," Working papers 580, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    11. Stanley Fischer, 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 329-379, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    13. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
    14. Stanley Fischer, 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," NBER Working Papers 3702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Cukierman, 1998. "The Economics of Central Banking," International Economic Association Series, in: Holger C. Wolf (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 3, pages 37-82, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Jacek Lewkowicz & Michał Woźniak & Michał Wrzesiński, 2021. "Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited," Working Papers 2021-06, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    3. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Schaling, Eric & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 73-88, February.
    4. Joshua Aizenman & Menzie D. Chinn & Hiro Ito, 2012. "The Financial Crisis, Rethinking of the Global Financial Architecture, and the Trilemma," Chapters, in: Masahiro Kawai & Peter J. Morgan & Shinji Takagi (ed.), Monetary and Currency Policy Management in Asia, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Political Pressure on Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 715-744, June.
    6. Luis Felipe Céspedes C. & Rodrigo Valdés P., 2006. "Central Bank Autonomy: the Chilean Experience," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 9(1), pages 25-47, April.
    7. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
    8. Victoria COCIUG & Olga HINEV, 2019. "Optimal Monetary Policy: Theoretical And Practical Aspects," Contemporary Economy Journal, Constantin Brancoveanu University, vol. 4(1), pages 55-65.
    9. Alper, Emre & Hatipoglu, Ozan, 2009. "The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Turkey in the Pre- and Post-crisis Period of 2001 in Comparative Perspective: a Case for Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 18426, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007. "Will Monetary Policy Become More of a Science?," NBER Working Papers 13566, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Michael T. Kiley & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2024. "Central Banking Post Crises," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-035, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Ndjana, Willy Freddie & Alia, Didier Yélognissè & Mendo, Paulin, 2009. "Indépendance de la banque centrale et efficacité de la politique économique [Central bank independence and effectiveness of economic policy]," MPRA Paper 31372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2011. "Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis," NBER Working Papers 16755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Hall, Peter A. & Franzese, Robert J., 1997. "Mixed signals: central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European Monetary Union," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment FS I 97-307, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    15. Luis Felipe Céspedes & Rodrigo Valdés, 2006. "Autonomía de Bancos Centrales: La Experiencia Chilena," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 358, Central Bank of Chile.
    16. Sfia, Mohamed Daly, 2007. "Régimes de change: Le chemin vers la flexibilité," MPRA Paper 4085, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Sánchez, José Miguel & Sanhueza, Ricardo & Letelier, Leonardo S., 1998. "Autonomía de las instituciones gubernamentales de Chile," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6120, Inter-American Development Bank.

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