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Central Bank Autonomy: the Chilean Experience

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  • Luis Felipe Céspedes C.
  • Rodrigo Valdés P.

Abstract

A selective revision to the theoretical and empirical literature on macroeconomic performance and central bank autonomy, yields new evidence of the relationship between the latter and the passthrough coefficient from the exchange rate to inflation. An analysis follows, from diverse viewpoints, to the way central bank autonomy has worked in practice in Chile, what were the issues being debated at the beginning and how they have unfolded later. The Central Bank of Chile’s (CBC) autonomy is then compared with that of other central banks, discussing the role of central banks’ capital. The conclusion from the analysis is that the CBC’s experience with autonomy has had very positive results.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Felipe Céspedes C. & Rodrigo Valdés P., 2006. "Central Bank Autonomy: the Chilean Experience," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 9(1), pages 25-47, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchec:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:25-47
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    References listed on IDEAS

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