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Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Jacek Lewkowicz

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

  • Michał Woźniak

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

  • Michał Wrzesiński

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)

Abstract

The subject of central bank independence (CBI) and its consequences for monetary policy and economic development has been widely explored in public debate and research discourse. The main aim of the article is to analyze central bank independence, considering the institutional environment in a given country. Our primary focus is on the relevance of de jure provisions for de facto CBI, as well as on the importance of other structural factors. We rely on a dataset consisting of various novel indices to approximate these issues across multiple dimensions and apply advanced econometric tools to investigate our research tasks. The outcome of the study implies that the interrelationships between de jure and de facto CBI are observable. Thus, these conclusions may be successfully applied in institutional design and public policies regarding central banking.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacek Lewkowicz & Michał Woźniak & Michał Wrzesiński, 2021. "Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited," Working Papers 2021-06, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2021-06
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    File URL: https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/6434/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank independence; uncertainty; political economy; law & economics; institutional economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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