Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget Constraints
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3207
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007.
"Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," NBER Working Papers 11765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
- David G. Luenberger & Yinyu Ye, 2016. "Linear and Nonlinear Programming," International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, Springer, edition 4, number 978-3-319-18842-3, December.
- Ariel Kulik & Hadas Shachnai & Tami Tamir, 2013. "Approximations for Monotone and Nonmonotone Submodular Maximization with Knapsack Constraints," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 729-739, November.
- Unknown, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8w16v26k, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Jin Zhang & Jilong Zhang & Guoqing Chen, 2023. "A semantic transfer approach to keyword suggestion for search engine advertising," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 921-947, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Mueller-Frank, Manuel & M. Pai, Mallesh, 2015. "Do Online Social Networks Increase Welfare?," IESE Research Papers D/1118, IESE Business School.
- Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," ISER Discussion Paper 1001, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin, 2012. "A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 699-708.
- Yongmin Chen & Chuan He, 2011.
"Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(556), pages 309-328, November.
- Yongmin Chen & Chuan He, 2006. "Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet," Working Papers 06-02, NET Institute, revised Sep 2006.
- D Laffey & C Hunka & J A Sharp & Z Zeng, 2009. "Estimating advertisers' values for paid search clickthroughs," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 60(3), pages 411-418, March.
- Paul Dütting & Felix Fischer & David C. Parkes, 2019. "Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 196-211, February.
- Evgenia Christoforou & Antonio Fernández Anta & Agustín Santos, 2016. "A Mechanism for Fair Distribution of Resources without Payments," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(5), pages 1-20, May.
- Dütting, Paul & Fischer, Felix & Parkes, David C., 2019. "Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85877, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- L. Elisa Celis & Gregory Lewis & Markus Mobius & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2014.
"Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2927-2948, December.
- L. Elisa Celis & Gregory Lewis & Markus M. Mobius & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2012. "Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions," NBER Working Papers 18590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mohammad Zia & Ram C. Rao, 2019. "Search Advertising: Budget Allocation Across Search Engines," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(6), pages 1023-1037, November.
- Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan, 2020. "Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 327-341.
- Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020. "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 386-405.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Working Papers e116, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
- Snehalkumar & S. Gaikwad & Durim Morina & Adam Ginzberg & Catherine Mullings & Shirish Goyal & Dilrukshi Gamage & Christopher Diemert & Mathias Burton & Sharon Zhou & Mark Whiting & Karolina Ziulkoski, 2019. "Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms," Papers 1904.06722, arXiv.org.
- Ning Chen & Xiaotie Deng & Paul W. Goldberg & Jinshan Zhang, 2016. "On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 1174-1205, April.
- Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers 17-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Patrick Maillé & Bruno Tuffin, 2018. "Auctions for online ad space among advertisers sensitive to both views and clicks," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 485-506, September.
- Le, Phuong, 2018. "Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
- Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020.
"Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms,"
NBER Working Papers
26767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 993, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 20 Feb 2020.
More about this item
Keywords
internet advertising; revenue management; budget constraints; bidding strategies; uniform bidding; concise bidding;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:12:p:5785-5812. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.