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On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands

Author

Listed:
  • Ning Chen

    (Nanyang Technological University)

  • Xiaotie Deng

    (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

  • Paul W. Goldberg

    (University of Oxford)

  • Jinshan Zhang

    (University of Liverpool)

Abstract

We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have sharp multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer $$i$$ i wants a specific number $$d_i$$ d i of items; a bundle of size less than $$d_i$$ d i has no value. We consider the objective of setting prices and allocations in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has a number of properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important question in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue maximizing solution for two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and envy-free pricing. For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a realistic special case of “correlated values” where each buyer $$i$$ i has a valuation $$v_iq_j$$ v i q j for item $$j$$ j , where $$v_i$$ v i and $$q_j$$ q j are positive quantities associated with buyer $$i$$ i and item $$j$$ j respectively. We present a polynomial time algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing, if the demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found efficiently; the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.

Suggested Citation

  • Ning Chen & Xiaotie Deng & Paul W. Goldberg & Jinshan Zhang, 2016. "On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 1174-1205, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:31:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10878-014-9817-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-014-9817-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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