Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
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More about this item
Keywords
multi-object auction design; strategy-proof mechanism design; ex-post revenue maximization; minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism; non-quasilinear preferences; no wastage; equal treatment of equals;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
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