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Should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective

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  • Cesar Martinelli
  • Susan W. Parker

Abstract

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest-constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational "and" intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesar Martinelli & Susan W. Parker, 2003. "Should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 523-544, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:523-544
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Schultz, T., 2004. "School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa poverty program," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 199-250, June.
    2. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher Flinn & Matthew Wiswall, 2016. "Transfers to Households with Children and Child Development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(596), pages 136-183, October.
    3. Ponczek, Vladimir, 2011. "Income and bargaining effects on education and health in Brazil," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 242-253, March.
    4. Orazem, Peter F. & King, Elizabeth M., 2008. "Schooling in Developing Countries: The Roles of Supply, Demand and Government Policy," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 55, pages 3475-3559, Elsevier.
    5. Campo, Juan Carlos Chavez-Martin del, 2006. "Does Conditionality Generate Heterogeneity and Regressivity in Program Impacts? The Progresa Experience," Working Papers 127042, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    6. Susan W. Parker & Graciela M. Teruel, 2005. "Randomization and Social Program Evaluation: The Case of Progresa," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 599(1), pages 199-219, May.
    7. Handa, Sudhanshu & Davis, Benjamin, 2006. "The experience of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean," ESA Working Papers 289060, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA).
    8. Tomoki Fujii & Christine Ho & Rohan Ray & Abu S. Shonchoy, 2021. "Conditional Cash Transfer, Loss Framing, and SMS Nudges: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Bangladesh," Working Papers 2109, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    9. Akresh, Richard & de Walque, Damien & Kazianga, Harounan, 2013. "Cash transfers and child schooling : evidence from a randomized evaluation of the role of conditionality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6340, The World Bank.
    10. Seiro ITO, 2006. "Raising Educational Attainment Of The Poor: Policies And Issues," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 44(4), pages 500-531, December.
    11. Behrman, Jere R., 2010. "Investment in Education Inputs and Incentives," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4883-4975, Elsevier.
    12. Heinrich, Carolyn J., 2007. "Demand and Supply-Side Determinants of Conditional Cash Transfer Program Effectiveness," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 121-143, January.
    13. Bryan, Gharad & Chowdhury, Shyamal & Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq & Morten, Melanie & Smits, Joeri, 2023. "Encouragement and distortionary effects of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    14. Del Rey, Elena & Estevan, Fernanda, 2013. "Conditional cash transfers and education quality in the presence of credit constraints," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 76-84.
    15. Anuja Jayaraman & Jill L. Findeis, 2012. "Gender Relations and Effect of Credit Availability on Household Expenditure: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(4), pages 205-222, December.
    16. César Martinelli & Susan W. Parker, 2008. "Do School Subsidies Promote Human Capital Investment among the Poor?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 261-276, June.
    17. Emilio Gutierrez & Laura Juarez & Adrian Rubli, 2011. "Grandfathers and Grandsons: SHould Transfers be Targeted to Women?," Working Papers 1103, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    18. Lin, Xirong, 2023. "Food demand and cash transfers: A collective household approach with Homescan data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 233-259.
    19. Staffolani, Stefano & Valentini, Enzo, 2007. "Bequest taxation and efficient allocation of talents," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 648-672, July.

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