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The Impact of Traditional Culture on Farmers’ Moral Hazard Behavior in Crop Production: Evidence from China

Author

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  • Liguo Zhang

    (Institute of Poyang Lake Eco-economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330032, China)

  • Xuerong Li

    (Institute of Poyang Lake Eco-economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330032, China)

Abstract

To obtain higher yields, farmers may excessively use pesticides when they grow crops (like rice, vegetables, or fruit), causing moral hazard behavior. This paper examines how Chinese farmers’ moral hazard behavior in crop production is influenced by their traditional culture. A semi-parametric logistic model is used to investigate the impact of Chinese traditional culture on farmers’ moral hazard behavior. The results reveal that Chinese traditional culture has a positive effect on ameliorating the farmers’ excessive use of pesticides in crop production, which leads to a moral hazard in agro-product safety. Specifically, when we control for extraneous variables, the probability of moral hazard decreases by 15% if farmers consider their traditional culture in their production decisions. Moreover, the probability of moral hazard decreases by 17% if farmers consider the traditional culture as a powerful restraint regarding the use of pesticides. Our analysis provides some supportive evidence on the effect of Chinese traditional culture on mitigating farmers’ excessive use of pesticides.

Suggested Citation

  • Liguo Zhang & Xuerong Li, 2016. "The Impact of Traditional Culture on Farmers’ Moral Hazard Behavior in Crop Production: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-15, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:8:y:2016:i:7:p:643-:d:73506
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    Cited by:

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    3. Chih-Hsiung Chang, 2022. "Information Asymmetry and Card Debt Crisis in Taiwan," Bulletin of Applied Economics, Risk Market Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 123-145.
    4. Bourceret, Amélie & Accatino, Francesco & Robert, Corinne, 2024. "A modeling framework of a territorial socio-ecosystem to study the trajectories of change in agricultural phytosanitary practices," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 494(C).
    5. Zhou, Jiehong & Yang, Zhiying & Li, Kai & Yu, Xiaohua, 2019. "Direct intervention or indirect support? The effects of cooperative control measures on farmers’ implementation of quality and safety standards," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 1-1.
    6. Lushi Isuf & Çera Gentjan & Murrja Arif & Ujkani Sead, 2023. "Linking Farmers’ Bargaining Power in Trade to their Plans for Future Economic Activities," South East European Journal of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 18(2), pages 173-185, December.

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