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The Effect of Asymmetrically Held Information and Market Power in Agricultural Markets

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  • Jeffrey M. Perloff
  • Gordon C. Rausser

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  • Jeffrey M. Perloff & Gordon C. Rausser, 1983. "The Effect of Asymmetrically Held Information and Market Power in Agricultural Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(2), pages 366-372.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:65:y:1983:i:2:p:366-372.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    2. Carlton, Dennis W, 1979. "Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 189-209, March.
    3. Caves, Richard E., 1977. "Organization, Scale, and Performance of the Grain Trade," Food Research Institute Studies, Stanford University, Food Research Institute, vol. 16(3), pages 1-18.
    4. Newbery, David M G & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 223-246, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Buccola, Steven T., 1989. "Pricing Efficiency In Agricultural Markets: Issues, Methods, And Results," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-11, July.
    2. Liguo Zhang & Xuerong Li, 2016. "The Impact of Traditional Culture on Farmers’ Moral Hazard Behavior in Crop Production: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-15, July.
    3. Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1991. "Econometric analysis of imperfect competition and implications for trade research," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt46w1j22d, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    4. Sporleder, Thomas L. & Colling, Phil L., 1986. "Competition And Price Relationships For An Electronic Market," 1986 Annual Meeting, July 27-30, Reno, Nevada 278102, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Ruppel, Fred J. & Fuller, Stephen W., 1992. "Information Impacts And Determinants Of Information Selection: An Experimental Approach," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-12, July.
    6. Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Value Differentiation," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 1-21, December.

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