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Competitive Centipede Games: Zero-End Payoffs and Payoff Inequality Deter Reciprocal Cooperation

Author

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  • Eva M. Krockow

    (Department of Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK)

  • Briony D. Pulford

    (Department of Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK)

  • Andrew M. Colman

    (Department of Neuroscience, Psychology and Behaviour, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK)

Abstract

Reciprocal cooperation can be studied in the Centipede game, in which two players alternate in choosing between a cooperative GO move and a non-cooperative STOP move. GO sustains the interaction and increases the player pair’s total payoff while incurring a small personal cost; STOP terminates the interaction with a favorable payoff to the defector. We investigated cooperation in four Centipede games differing in their payoffs at the game’s end (positive versus zero) and payoff difference between players (moderate versus high difference). The games shared the same game-theoretic solution, therefore they should have elicited identical decision patterns, according to orthodox game theory. Nevertheless, both zero-end payoffs and high payoff inequality were found to reduce cooperation significantly. Contrary to previous predictions, combining these two factors in one game resulted in a slight weakening of their independent deterrent effects. These findings show that small changes in the payoff function have large and significant effects on cooperation, and that the effects do not combine synergistically.

Suggested Citation

  • Eva M. Krockow & Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman, 2015. "Competitive Centipede Games: Zero-End Payoffs and Payoff Inequality Deter Reciprocal Cooperation," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:6:y:2015:i:3:p:262-272:d:54381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eva M. Krockow & Masanori Takezawa & Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman & Samuel Smithers & Toshimasa Kita & Yo Nakawake, 2018. "Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European–Japanese differences in trust and cooperation," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 13(1), pages 61-72, January.
    2. Wolfram Elsner, 2019. "Policy and state in complexity economics," Chapters, in: Nikolaos Karagiannis & John E. King (ed.), A Modern Guide to State Intervention, chapter 1, pages 13-48, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Briony D Pulford & Eva M Krockow & Andrew M Colman & Catherine L Lawrence, 2016. "Social Value Induction and Cooperation in the Centipede Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(3), pages 1-21, March.
    4. Krockow, Eva M. & Pulford, Briony D. & Colman, Andrew M., 2018. "Far but finite horizons promote cooperation in the Centipede game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 191-199.
    5. repec:cup:judgdm:v:13:y:2018:i:1:p:61-72 is not listed on IDEAS

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