Experimental economics and deception: A comment
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- Weimann, Joachim, 1994. "Individual behaviour in a free riding experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 185-200, June.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
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Cited by:
- Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2002.
"The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-131, October.
- Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2001. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp191, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2002. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology," Game Theory and Information 0203001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gregory Colson & Jay R. Corrigan & Carola Grebitus & Maria L. Loureiro & Matthew C. Rousu, 2016. "Which Deceptive Practices, If Any, Should Be Allowed in Experimental Economics Research? Results from Surveys of Applied Experimental Economists and Students," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(2), pages 610-621.
- Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean & Schechter, Laura, 2008.
"To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 477-488, December.
- Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean & Schechter, Laura, 2006. "To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior inFuture Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 18, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Davide Barrera & Brent Simpson, 2012. "Much Ado About Deception," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 41(3), pages 383-413, August.
- Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(3), pages 215-240, December.
- Robert J. Johnston & Kevin J. Boyle & Wiktor (Vic) Adamowicz & Jeff Bennett & Roy Brouwer & Trudy Ann Cameron & W. Michael Hanemann & Nick Hanley & Mandy Ryan & Riccardo Scarpa & Roger Tourangeau & Ch, 2017. "Contemporary Guidance for Stated Preference Studies," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(2), pages 319-405.
- Eva M. Krockow & Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman, 2015. "Competitive Centipede Games: Zero-End Payoffs and Payoff Inequality Deter Reciprocal Cooperation," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11, August.
- Michał Krawczyk, 2013. "Delineating deception in experimental economics: Researchers' and subjects' views," Working Papers 2013-11, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
- Despoina Alempaki & Valeria Burdea & Daniel Read, 2021.
"Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence,"
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9286, CESifo.
- Despoina Alempaki & Valeria Burdea & Daniel Read, 2023. "Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 444, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Gary Charness & Anya Samek & Jeroen Ven, 2022. "What is considered deception in experimental economics?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 385-412, April.
- Krawczyk, Michał, 2019. "What should be regarded as deception in experimental economics? Evidence from a survey of researchers and subjects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 110-118.
- Briony D. Pulford & Andrew M. Colman & Graham Loomes, 2018. "Incentive Magnitude Effects in Experimental Games: Bigger is not Necessarily Better," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-10, January.
- Alberti, Federica & Güth, Werner, 2013.
"Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 196-204.
- Federica Alberti & Werner Güth, 2012. "Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control without Deception," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-107/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Arthur Schram, 2005. "Artificiality: The tension between internal and external validity in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 225-237.
- Jost, Peter J. & Pünder, Johanna & Schulze-Lohoff, Isabell, 2020. "Fake news - Does perception matter more than the truth?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
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