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On the Centipede Game

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  • Aumann, Robert J.

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  • Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-105, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:1:p:97-105
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November.
    2. Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 135-137, November.
    3. N/A, 1996. "Note:," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 31(1-2), pages 1-1, January.
    4. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
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