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Distributed Dispatch and Profit Allocation for Parks Using Co-Operative Game Theory and the Generalized Nash Bargaining Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Hanwen Wang

    (Suqian Wanda Electric Power Industry Co., Ltd., Suqian 223800, China)

  • Xiang Li

    (School of Electrical and Power Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China)

  • Haojun Hu

    (Suqian Wanda Electric Power Industry Co., Ltd., Suqian 223800, China)

  • Yizhou Zhou

    (School of Electrical and Power Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China)

Abstract

To improve the regulatory capacity of distributed resources within the park and enhance the flexibility of market transactions, this paper introduces a distributed dispatch and profit allocation method grounded in cooperative game theory and the generalized Nash bargaining framework. Initially, models for individual park equipment are established. Subsequently, a distributed dispatch model is constructed, followed by the development of a profit allocation strategy based on contribution levels, using the generalized Nash bargaining method. The model is solved using the alternating direction method of multipliers. The results show that the proposed approach achieves fast convergence, optimizes resource sharing and mutual support within the park, lowers operational costs, ensures a fairer distribution of profits, and promotes increased cooperation among park entities.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanwen Wang & Xiang Li & Haojun Hu & Yizhou Zhou, 2024. "Distributed Dispatch and Profit Allocation for Parks Using Co-Operative Game Theory and the Generalized Nash Bargaining Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 17(23), pages 1-19, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:17:y:2024:i:23:p:6143-:d:1537723
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    References listed on IDEAS

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