IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jeners/v16y2023i14p5359-d1193698.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stakeholder Perspectives on Energy Auctions: A Case Study in Roraima, Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Pedro Meirelles Villas-Bôas

    (Ph.D. Program in Bioenergy, (Unicamp, USP, Unesp), University of Campinas, Campinas 13083-896, São Paulo, Brazil)

  • José Maria Ferreira Jardim da Silveira

    (Institute of Economics, Center for Agricultural and Environmental Economics (NEA), University of Campinas, Campinas 13083-857, São Paulo, Brazil)

  • Fernando Rocha Villas-Bôas

    (Interior Point Methods Group—CNPq/Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Campinas, Campinas 13098-320, São Paulo, Brazil)

Abstract

Energy auctions are commonly used to contract energy projects and are extensively studied from the regulator’s perspective. However, analyzing auctions from the stakeholders’ perspective is critical to determine the impact of regulatory details on the bidder’s revenues. In this study, we analyze a public energy auction in Roraima, a Brazilian state with a significant energy deficit and no grid connection, where many projects were successful in the non-intermittent Power Product category, typically unfavorable for biomass. Using Linear Programming to maximize bidders’ revenues, we examine the regulatory formulas that contributed to the success of these projects and compare the optimization results to actual revenues. Our analysis shows that certain regulatory elements can benefit stakeholders by allowing them to make unconventional project design decisions. In addition, we identify a possible loophole in the formula that can have the opposite effect of the regulator’s intent in the renewable Power Product category. Our findings can help bidders increase profits through optimization and regulators to change formulas if objectives are not met. This study brings the often-overlooked perspective of stakeholders to energy auctions, adding to the literature on this topic.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Meirelles Villas-Bôas & José Maria Ferreira Jardim da Silveira & Fernando Rocha Villas-Bôas, 2023. "Stakeholder Perspectives on Energy Auctions: A Case Study in Roraima, Brazil," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(14), pages 1-19, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:16:y:2023:i:14:p:5359-:d:1193698
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/14/5359/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/14/5359/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    3. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1989. "Markets and Development," NBER Working Papers 2961, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Loraima Jaramillo-Nieves & Pablo Del Río, 2010. "Contribution of Renewable Energy Sources to the Sustainable Development of Islands: An Overview of the Literature and a Research Agenda," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-29, March.
    5. del Río, Pablo & Kiefer, Christoph P., 2023. "Academic research on renewable electricity auctions: Taking stock and looking forward," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    6. Rosen, Christiane & Madlener, Reinhard, 2013. "The Role of Information Feedback in Local Reserve Energy Auction Markets," FCN Working Papers 15/2013, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN).
    7. Rosen, Christiane & Madlener, Reinhard, 2012. "Auction Design for Local Reserve Energy Markets," FCN Working Papers 7/2012, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), revised Mar 2013.
    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1989. "Markets, Market Failures, and Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 197-203, May.
    9. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
    2. Markus Groth, 2009. "The transferability and performance of payment-by-results biodiversity conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from northernmost Germany," Working Paper Series in Economics 119, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    3. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2009. "Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 48171, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    4. Cassetta, Ernesto & Monarca, Umberto & Nava, Consuelo Rubina & Meleo, Linda, 2017. "Is the answer blowin' in the wind (auctions)? An assessment of the Italian support scheme," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 662-674.
    5. Brett Bryan & Jeffery Connor et al, 2005., 2005. "Catchment Care - Developing an Auction Process for Biodiversity and Water Quality Gains. Volume 1 - Report," Natural Resource Management Economics 05_004, Policy and Economic Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water, Adelaide, Australia.
    6. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    7. Moldovanu, Benny & Ewerhart II, Christian, 2001. "The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-05, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    8. Pickl, Matthias & Wirl, Franz, 2011. "Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity--The case of Nabucco and its open season," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 2143-2151, April.
    9. Jens Prüfer & David Zetland, 2010. "An auction market for journal articles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 379-403, December.
    10. Werner Hölzl & Michael Böheim & Michael Klien & Eva Pichler, 2017. "Das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Billigst- und Bestbieterprinzip," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 59256, March.
    11. Elbittar, Alexander, 2009. "Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 75-85, January.
    12. Pantelis Koutroumpis & Martin Cave, 2018. "Auction design and auction outcomes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 275-297, June.
    13. Rousseau Sandra & Moons Ellen, "undated". "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: An Application to the Flemish Afforestation Policy," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0606, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    14. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    15. Sonin Konstantin, 2004. "Private interest in public tenders: no revenue, no efficiency and no social benefits," EERC Working Paper Series 00-111e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    16. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2006. "Information revelation in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 181-205, November.
    17. Antal-Pomázi, Krisztina, 2012. "Public Procurement as Auction – Theoretical Models and Practical Problems," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 57(4), pages 381-393.
    18. Andrés Pereyra, 2001. "Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0302, Department of Economics - dECON.
    19. Boone, Audra L. & Harold Mulherin, J., 2008. "Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 1-19, July.
    20. David Evans & Andrew Reeson, 2022. "The Performance of a Repeated Discriminatory Price Auction for Ecosystem Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(4), pages 787-806, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:16:y:2023:i:14:p:5359-:d:1193698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.