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Das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Billigst- und Bestbieterprinzip

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Hölzl
  • Michael Böheim

    (WIFO)

  • Michael Klien
  • Eva Pichler

Abstract

Diese Studie analysiert die Verwendung von Bestbieter- und Billigstbieterprinzip in Österreich auf Basis ökonomischer Argumente und empirischer Evidenz. Wie die ökonomische Literatur zeigt, ist das Bestbieterprinzip bei Vorliegen bestimmter Projekteigenschaften (Volumen, Komplexität und vertragliche Unvollständigkeit) bzw. Marktstrukturen dem Billigstbieterprinzip überlegen. Österreich befindet sich zwar hinsichtlich der Verwendung des Bestangebotsprinzips mit Deutschland, Schweden und Finnland im europäischen Mittelfeld, die Gewichtung von preisfremden Kriterien im Rahmen von Bestbieterverfahren ist aber deutlich unterdurchschnittlich. Diese Befunde werden durch Interviews auf Auftraggeber und Auftragnehmerseite validiert und wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen diskutiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Hölzl & Michael Böheim & Michael Klien & Eva Pichler, 2017. "Das öffentliche Beschaffungswesen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Billigst- und Bestbieterprinzip," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 59256, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wfo:wstudy:59256
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Werner Hölzl & Klaus Friesenbichler & Agnes Kügler & Michael Peneder & Andreas Reinstaller & Gerhard Schwarz, 2016. "Österreich 2025 – Industrie 2025: Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Standortfaktoren, Markt- und Produktstrategien und die Positionierung österreichischer Unternehmen in der internationalen Wertschöpfungskette," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 59184.
    2. Michael Klien & Michael Böheim & Matthias Firgo & Andreas Reinstaller & Peter Reschenhofer & Yvonne Wolfmayr, 2021. "Stärkung der Unabhängigkeit des Wirtschaftsstandortes Österreich bei kritischen Produkten," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 67234.

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