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Environmental Exigencies and the Efficient Voter Rule

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  • David A. Anderson

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Centre College, 600 W. Walnut St., Danville, KY 40422, USA)

Abstract

Externality problems hinder solutions to existential threats, including climate change and mass extinction. To avert environmental crises, policymakers seek mechanisms that align private incentives with societal exigencies. Successful solutions bring individuals to internalize the broad repercussions of their behavior. In some cases, privatization, Coasian bargaining, or Pigouvian taxes effectively place the weight of externalities on the relevant decision makers. Yet, the available remedies often fail to provide satisfactory outcomes, and inefficiencies persist in the markets for energy, transportation, and manufactured goods, among others. This article explains how a simple voting mechanism can achieve socially optimal decisions about many of the innumerable externality problems that remain.

Suggested Citation

  • David A. Anderson, 2020. "Environmental Exigencies and the Efficient Voter Rule," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-7, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jecomi:v:8:y:2020:i:4:p:100-:d:446383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Knut Wicksell, 1958. "A New Principle of Just Taxation," International Economic Association Series, in: Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock (ed.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pages 72-118, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    Cited by:

    1. Liang Liu & Mengyue Li & Xiujuan Gong & Pan Jiang & Ruifeng Jin & Yuhan Zhang, 2022. "Influence Mechanism of Different Environmental Regulations on Carbon Emission Efficiency," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(20), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Zhengjie Gao & Dayi He & Shuaifang Niu, 2021. "On What Could Chinese Mining Enterprises Achieve High-Level Environmental Performance?—Based on the fsQCA Method," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(14), pages 1-16, July.

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