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Understanding Commons and Anticommons in different economic contexts

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  • Azaguagh, Ismail
  • Driouchi, Ahmed

Abstract

Many common resources are managed under private property rights-based systems. Privatizing these resources leads to fragmented property rights and scattered decisions. Gathering all these rights could lead to higher private and social costs. Heller has described this phenomenon as Anticommons Tragedy, with the resources underused and limited possibilities of innovation and development (Heller, 1998). The concept of Anticommons has been highlighted in the fields of intellectual property, media, and business. Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to shed light on Anticommons in the field of fisheries. The present article attempts to introduce the concepts of Commons and Anticommons, in light of previous studies focusing on the importance of property rights and access modes, for fishery resource management. Access rights management is the main problem that threatens the sustainability of fishery resources. The fisheries involve many interdependent economic stakeholders influencing the decisions of resource utilisation. In this context, the coordination failure leads to a chaotic situation where the fishery resources are underused.

Suggested Citation

  • Azaguagh, Ismail & Driouchi, Ahmed, 2018. "Understanding Commons and Anticommons in different economic contexts," MPRA Paper 116621, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:116621
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/116621/1/MPRA_paper_116621.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commons; fishery resources; Anticommons; access modes; costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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