Selected Mesoeconomic Indicators of Regional Development in Poland Based on Intermunicipal Cooperation
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More about this item
Keywords
Regional development; regional policy; mesoeconomics; intermunicipal cooperation; Poland.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
- R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
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