Effectiveness of the approval mechanism for CPR dilemmas: unanimity versus majority rule
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- Koffi Serge William Yao & Emmanuelle Lavaine & Marc Willinger, 2021. "Effectiveness of the approval mechanism for CPR dilemmas: unanimity versus majority rule," Working Papers hal-03235539, HAL.
- Koffi Serge William Yao & Emmanuelle Lavaine & Marc Willinger, 2021. "Effectiveness of the approval mechanism for CPR dilemmas: unanimity versus majority rule," CEE-M Working Papers hal-03234786, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
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Keywords
Approval mechanism; lab experiment; common pool resource; majority/unanimity; dference in difference;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2021-06-14 (Environmental Economics)
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