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The role of the Allee effect in common-pool resource and its sustainability

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  • Chengyi Tu
  • Fabio Menegazzo
  • Paolo D'Odorico
  • Samir Suweis

Abstract

The management of common-pool resources is a complex challenge due to the risk of overexploitation and the tragedy of the commons. A novel framework has been introduced to address this issue, focusing on the coevolutionary relationship between human behavior and common-pool resources within a human-environment system. However, the impact of the Allee effect on the coevolution and its resource sustainability is still unexplored. The Allee effect, a biological phenomenon characterized by a correlation between resource availability and growth rate, is a fundamental attribute of numerous natural resources. In this paper, we introduce two coevolutionary models of resource and strategy under replicator dynamics and knowledge feedback by applying the Allee effect to the common-pool resources within human-environment system. These models encapsulate various facets of resource dynamics and the players' behavior, such as resource growth function, the extraction rates, and the strategy update rules. We find that the Allee effect can induce bi-stability and critical transition, leading to either sustainable or unsustainable outcomes depending on the initial condition and parameter configuration. We demonstrate that knowledge feedback enhances the resilience and sustainability of the coevolving system, and these results advances the understanding of human-environment system and management of common-pool resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Chengyi Tu & Fabio Menegazzo & Paolo D'Odorico & Samir Suweis, 2024. "The role of the Allee effect in common-pool resource and its sustainability," Papers 2405.01271, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2405.01271
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Runyan, Christiane W. & D'Odorico, Paolo & Shobe, William, 2015. "The economic impacts of positive feedbacks resulting from deforestation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 93-99.
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    3. Chengyi Tu & Renfei Chen & Ying Fan & Xuwei Pan, 2023. "Impact of resource availability and conformity effect on sustainability of common-pool resources," Papers 2310.07577, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    4. Ostrom, Elinor, 2006. "The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 149-163, October.
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