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Short term adjustments in rail activity: the limited role of infrastructure charges

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  • Quinet, Emile

Abstract

In many countries and especially in Europe, railway reforms have fragmented the rail industries into one infrastructure manager and several rail operators, and raised new interest in railway short term adjustment, a procedure hitherto run inside the integrated historical operator. Often implicitly, it is assumed that this problem can be solved through the same tool as in road transport, namely through infrastructure charging. The argument presented here is that, due to the differences between road and rail markets, pricing cannot be a proper way to achieve an optimal allocation of rail resources. The right means for that objective should be centralized programming, taking into account various externalities, if information were perfect. Information asymmetry on private values of the services for rail operators can be dealt with through auctions, the results of which are used as input in an optimization procedure led by the regulator. These considerations lead to assess the right role of infrastructure charges in rail, and to draw some conclusions about research fields to explore and means to improve the present practices.

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  • Quinet, Emile, 2003. "Short term adjustments in rail activity: the limited role of infrastructure charges," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 73-79, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:10:y:2003:i:1:p:73-79
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brewer, Paul J. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 857-886, October.
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    1. Nash, Chris & Coulthard, Simon & Matthews, Bryan, 2004. "Rail track charges in Great Britain--the issue of charging for capacity," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 315-327, October.
    2. de Palma, André & Lindsey, Robin, 2007. "Chapter 2 Transport user charges and cost recovery," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 29-57, January.
    3. Markus Lang & Marc Laperrouza & Matthias Finger, 2013. "Competition Effects in a Liberalized Railway Market," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 375-398, September.
    4. Perennes, Patricia, 2014. "Use of combinatorial auctions in the railway industry: Can the “invisible hand” draw the railway timetable?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 175-187.
    5. Henry Ergas, 2009. "An excess of access: An examination of Part IIIA of the Australian Trade Practices Act," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 16(4), pages 37-66.
    6. Chris Nash, 2011. "Competition and Regulation in Rail Transport," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 33, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Ginés de Rus & Javier Campos & Daniel Graham & M. Pilar Socorro & Jorge Valido, 2020. "Evaluación Económica de Proyectos y Políticas de Transporte: Metodología y Aplicaciones. Parte 1: Metodología para el análisis coste-beneficio de proyectos y políticas de transporte," Working Papers 2020-11, FEDEA.

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