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Unravelling the influence of formal and informal institutions on the duration of public concessions

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  • Fleta-Asín, Jorge
  • Muñoz, Fernando
  • Sáenz-Royo, Carlos

Abstract

The growing prominence of public–private partnerships featuring concessions has become a focal point in the management realm. Concession agreements, often spanning numerous years, imbue projects with continuity and stability. Through the theory of neo-institutionalism, we analyse the influence of formal and informal institutions on the duration of these projects across diverse countries, showing the pivotal role played by the institutional environment and consensus mechanisms in ensuring the success of such collaborative endeavours. The findings furnish valuable insights for practitioners and policymakers by facilitating the identification of optimal conditions to establish enduring and highly effective concession agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Fleta-Asín, Jorge & Muñoz, Fernando & Sáenz-Royo, Carlos, 2024. "Unravelling the influence of formal and informal institutions on the duration of public concessions," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceps:v:95:y:2024:i:c:s0038012124001654
    DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2024.101966
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