Institutional Environment and the Strategies of the Firms of the Brazilian Electricity Industry
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Keywords
Brazilian Electricity Industry Transaction costs economics Vertical integration;JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
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