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Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges

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  • Garrouste, Pierre
  • Saussier, Stephane

Abstract

In this paper we present the main developments of the theories of the firm rooted in Coase's [Coase, R.H., 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, New Series 4, 386–405] seminal article. We show that the two important topics of the nature and boundaries of the firm, as well as the internal organization of the firm, give place to essential contributions. We present those contributions and their limits and then their possible developments. Finally we introduce the papers of this issue.
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  • Garrouste, Pierre & Saussier, Stephane, 2005. "Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 178-199, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:58:y:2005:i:2:p:178-199
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    3. Rahmeyer Fritz, 2013. "Schumpeter, Marshall, and Neo-Schumpeterian Evolutionary Economics: A Critical Stocktaking," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 233(1), pages 39-64, February.
    4. Jindal, Rupinder, 2011. "Reducing the Size of Internal Hierarchy: The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 87(4), pages 549-562.
    5. Nogalski Bogdan & Niewiadomski Przemysław & Szpitter Agnieszka, 2018. "Technical dynamic capabilities in the opinion of Polish producers from the agricultural machines sector," Management, Sciendo, vol. 22(2), pages 264-284, December.
    6. Robert Vitík, 2008. "Transactions cost and boundary of the firm," Ekonomika a Management, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2008(3).
    7. Kam Ki Tang & Leopoldo Yanes, 2009. "The hierarchical structure of the firm: a geometric perspective," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(2), pages 156-175.
    8. Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, 2016. "Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2481-2502, December.
    9. Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft & Jolian Peter McHardy, 2015. "Real firms, transaction costs and firm development: a suggested formalisation," Working Papers 2015004, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
    10. Niewiadomski Przemysław, 2020. "Business model maturity in management theory and practice – defining from an expert perspective," Management, Sciendo, vol. 24(1), pages 81-103, June.
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    12. Fritz Rahmeyer, 2006. "From a Routine-Based to a Knowledge-Based View: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of the Firm," Discussion Paper Series 283, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
    13. Fritz Rahmeyer, 2010. "A Neo-Darwinian Foundation of Evolutionary Economics. With an Application to the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Paper Series 309, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
    14. James H. Love, 2010. "Opportunism, Hold-Up and the (Contractual) Theory of the Firm," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(3), pages 479-501, September.
    15. Jean-Luc Gaffard & Sarah Guillou & Lionel Nesta, 2012. "R&D and Industrial Policy: Policies to Coordinate Investments in Research under Radical Uncertainty," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 35, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-027 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Institutional competition, political process and holdup," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-027, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    18. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Governance: Who controls matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-053, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    19. Nathalie Lazaric & Alain Raybaut, 2007. "Knowledge, Hierarchy and incentives: Why human resource policy and trust matter," Post-Print hal-00453292, HAL.
    20. Michael I.C. Nwogugu, 2019. "Complex Systems, Multi-Sided Incentives and Risk Perception in Companies," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-44704-3, March.

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