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Prosperity without conflict

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  • Gonzalez, Francisco M.
  • Neary, Hugh M.

Abstract

Social conflict and slow growth are features of many developing economies. This paper considers the role institutions of property rights and conflict management can play in both achieving prosperity and mitigating conflict in these economies. We study how introducing conflict over economic distribution into an otherwise standard model of growth can shape optimal (second-best) taxation policy when diversionary activities cannot be taxed. In this context, we find that the maximization of economic efficiency may call for a reduction in growth in order to mitigate the problem of diversion, even though the economy's growth is inefficiently slow in the absence of taxation. This is so when institutional quality is sufficiently poor, but not otherwise. The paper warns against the conventional justification of growth-promoting policies on efficiency grounds independently of institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalez, Francisco M. & Neary, Hugh M., 2008. "Prosperity without conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2170-2181, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:10-11:p:2170-2181
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    3. Rowthorn, Robert & Seabright, Paul, 2010. "Property Rights, Warfare and the Neolithic Transition," TSE Working Papers 10-207, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. J. Amegashie, 2011. "Incomplete property rights and overinvestment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 81-95, June.
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    6. Stelian Brad & Bogdan Mocan & Emilia Brad & Mircea Fulea, 2016. "Environmentally Sustainable Economic Growth," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 18(42), pages 446-446, May.
    7. David M. Bruner & Robert J. Oxoby, 2009. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Investment? Appropriation Through Conflict," Working Papers 09-06, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.

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