Rent‐Seeking And Capital Accumulation
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DOI: j.1465-7295.2010.00318.x
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Cited by:
- Bohn Frank, 2013. "The Politics of Surprise Devaluations: Modelling Motives for Giving Up a Peg," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 233(5-6), pages 562-574, October.
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- Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2013.
"Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 360-386, November.
- Bonnie Wilson & Jac Heckelman, 2012. "Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance," Working Papers 2012-02, Saint Louis University, Department of Economics.
- Sergio, Reuben, 2012. "Fundamentos hipotéticos para investigar la crisis económica contemporánea [Hypothetical foundations to investigate the contemporary economic crisis]," MPRA Paper 43067, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Nov 2012.
- del Río, Fernando, 2018. "Property Rights, Predation, and Productivity," MPRA Paper 86246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
- O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
- O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
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