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The Distribution of Political Power, the Costs of Rent-Seeking, and Economic Growth

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  • Sturzenegger, Federico
  • Tommasi, Mariano

Abstract

Poor economic growth in many countries can be explained by the misallocation of entrepreneurial resources to activities that do not foster growth. This paper deals with the relation between the distribution of political power, the allocation of entrepreneurial resources, and growth. The authors model growth as deriving from Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who try to increase profits through innovation. They endogenize the choice of time devoted to this activity vis-a-vis other ways of increasing income, such as obtaining government subsidies. More unequal access to the political redistribution mechanism makes rent-seeking activities less profitable and results in higher growth. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Sturzenegger, Federico & Tommasi, Mariano, 1994. "The Distribution of Political Power, the Costs of Rent-Seeking, and Economic Growth," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 236-248, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:2:p:236-48
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2012. "Political Economy of Conflict Foreword," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 153-169.
    2. Rachel L. Coyne, 2014. "Economic freedom, entrepreneurship and growth," Chapters, in: Robert F. Salvino Jr. & Michael T. Tasto & Gregory M. Randolph (ed.), Entrepreneurial Action, Public Policy, and Economic Outcomes, chapter 3, pages 34-51, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    4. Sebastián M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 169-209, May.
    5. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    6. Rok Spruk, 2019. "The rise and fall of Argentina," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 28(1), pages 1-40, December.
    7. Roland Hodler, 2007. "Rent seeking and aid effectiveness," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(5), pages 525-541, October.
    8. Roland Hodler, 2004. "Redistribution to Rent Seekers, Foreign Aid and Economic Growth," Diskussionsschriften dp0406, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    9. Gonzalez, Francisco M. & Neary, Hugh M., 2008. "Prosperity without conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2170-2181, October.
    10. Ben Fine, 1998. "Endogenous Growth Theory: A Critical Assessment," Working Papers 80, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London, UK.
    11. Colombatto, Enrico, 1998. "An Institutional View of LDC Failure," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 631-648, October.
    12. Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2007. "Effective property rights, conflict and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
    13. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2012. "Avant-Propos," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 135-151.

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