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Endogenous insecurity and economic development

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  • Lloyd-Ellis, Huw
  • Marceau, Nicolas

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  • Lloyd-Ellis, Huw & Marceau, Nicolas, 2003. "Endogenous insecurity and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-29, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:72:y:2003:i:1:p:1-29
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    1. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & José A. Scheinkman, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 507-548.
    2. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    3. Fender, John, 1999. "A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 437-453, July.
    4. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218, Springer.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 407-443.
    7. Baumol, William J., 1996. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-22, January.
    8. Marshall I. Goldman, 1996. "Why Is the Mafia so Dominant in Russia?," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(2), pages 39-47, March.
    9. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-1295, December.
    10. Usher, Dan, 1989. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1031-1044, December.
    11. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    12. Acemoglu, Daron, 1995. "Reward structures and the allocation of talent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, January.
    13. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
    14. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 1999. "Dissuader le crime," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9902, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    15. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
    16. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
    2. Nunn, Nathan, 2007. "Historical legacies: A model linking Africa's past to its current underdevelopment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 157-175, May.
    3. Yoshito Takasaki, 2011. "Fraud and Poverty: Exploring Ex Ante Victim Data," Tsukuba Economics Working Papers 2011-002, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba.
    4. Lozano-Cortés, René & Lozano-Cortés, Maribel & Cabrera-Castellanos, Luis F., 2016. "Determinantes socioeconómicos del crimen en México [The Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime: The case of Mexico]," MPRA Paper 68922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Lozano-Cortés, René & Cabrera-Castellanos, Luis F. & Lozano-Cortés, Maribel, 2012. "La delincuencia y su efecto sobre el crecimiento económico. El caso de México [Crime and Economic Growth. The case of Mexico]," MPRA Paper 39678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Yiyong Cai & David Newth, 2013. "Oil, Gas and Conflict: A Mathematical Model for the Resource Curse," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(6), pages 1-10, June.
    7. Gonzalez, Francisco M. & Neary, Hugh M., 2008. "Prosperity without conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2170-2181, October.
    8. Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio, 2016. "Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach," Other publications TiSEM 1e39ef1b-43a2-4f95-892c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl & Torvik, Ragnar, 2005. "Crime induced poverty traps," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 325-340, August.
    10. Rafael Alexis Acevedo Rueda & Mónica Isabel García-Pérez, 2015. "The Price of Crime: How Crime Affects Private Investment in South America," Revista Economía y Región, Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar, vol. 9(2), pages 47-74, December.

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