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Supplier coalitions in on-line reverse auctions: Validity requirements and profit distribution scheme

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  • Jin, Mingzhou
  • Wu, S. David

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  • Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David, 2006. "Supplier coalitions in on-line reverse auctions: Validity requirements and profit distribution scheme," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 183-194, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:100:y:2006:i:2:p:183-194
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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1992. "The core in imperfectly competitive economies," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 459-483, Elsevier.
    3. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1990. "Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 493-510, June.
    4. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
      • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    5. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    6. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. "The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
    7. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    8. Kannai, Yakar, 1992. "The core and balancedness," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 355-395, Elsevier.
    9. Peleg, Bezalel, 1992. "Axiomatizations of the core," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 397-412, Elsevier.
    10. Carter, Craig R. & Kaufmann, Lutz & Beall, Stewart & Carter, Phillip L. & Hendrick, Thomas E. & Petersen, Kenneth J., 2004. "Reverse auctions--grounded theory from the buyer and supplier perspective," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 229-254, May.
    11. Anderson, Robert M., 1992. "The core in perfectly competitive economies," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 413-457, Elsevier.
    12. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    13. Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Game theory and the spectrum auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 771-778, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shuya Yin, 2010. "Alliance Formation Among Perfectly Complementary Suppliers in a Price-Sensitive Assembly System," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 12(3), pages 527-544, October.
    2. Hennet, Jean-Claude & Mahjoub, Sonia, 2010. "Toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 112-120, September.
    3. Mohebbi, Shima & Li, Xueping, 2015. "Coalitional game theory approach to modeling suppliers' collaboration in supply networks," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 333-342.
    4. Jin, Mingzhou & Junfang Yu, Andrew, 2015. "Procurement auctions and supply chain performance," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 192-200.
    5. Yuhong He & Shuya Yin, 2015. "Joint Selling of Complementary Components Under Brand and Retail Competition," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 17(4), pages 470-479, October.
    6. Baozhuang Niu & Jingmai Wang & Carman K. M. Lee & Lei Chen, 2019. "“Product + logistics” bundling sale and co-delivery in cross-border e-commerce," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 915-941, December.
    7. Kleijnen, Jack P.C. & van Schaik, Frans D.J., 2011. "Sealed-bid auction of Netherlands mussels: Statistical analysis," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 154-161, July.
    8. Sijing Deng & Jiayan Xu, 2020. "Ex ante and Ex post Subcontracting between Two Competing Bidders," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 37(01), pages 1-22, January.
    9. Bagchi, Aniruddha & Aliyas Paul, Jomon & Maloni, Michael, 2011. "Improving bid efficiency for humanitarian food aid procurement," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 238-245, November.

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