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Game theory and the spectrum auctions

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  • Milgrom, Paul

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  • Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Game theory and the spectrum auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 771-778, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:42:y:1998:i:3-5:p:771-778
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    2. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    3. repec:bla:jemstr:v:4:y:1995:i:2:p:267-343:a is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Dass, Mayukh & Jank, Wolfgang & Shmueli, Galit, 2011. "Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 1259-1270, October.
    2. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test," Working Papers 200102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    3. van Damme, E.E.C., 1998. "The auction of DCS-1800 licences," Other publications TiSEM b842dbd8-b285-4314-8506-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Anders Lunander & Jan-Eric Nilsson, 2004. "Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-58, January.
    5. Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020. "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-215.
    6. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1557-1569, December.
    7. Xiao, Jucheng & He, Guangyu & Fan, Shuai & Li, Zuyi, 2022. "Substitute energy price market mechanism for renewable energy power system with generalized energy storage," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 328(C).
    8. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2000. "Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-16, March.
    9. van Damme, E.E.C., 1999. "The Dutch DCS-1800 auction," Other publications TiSEM 91daa0d5-2984-4ad9-afce-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David, 2006. "Supplier coalitions in on-line reverse auctions: Validity requirements and profit distribution scheme," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 183-194, April.
    11. Dass, Mayukh & Reddy, Srinivas K. & Iacobucci, Dawn, 2014. "A Network Bidder Behavior Model in Online Auctions: A Case of Fine Art Auctions," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 90(4), pages 445-462.
    12. Alison Watts, 2024. "Auctioning off a Non-Rivalrous Good with Interference," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-11, July.
    13. LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002. "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," HEC Research Papers Series 765, HEC Paris.
    14. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    15. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.

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