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War and Peace

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  • Robert J. Aumann

Abstract

From his earliest publications, Cournot broke from tradition with his predecessors in applying mathematical modelling to the social sphere. Consequently, he was the first to affirm the mathematization of social phenomena as an essential principle. The fecundity of Cournot’s works stems not only from this departure, but also from a richness that irrigated the social sciences of the twentieth century. In this collection, the contributors – including two Nobel laureates in economics – highlight Cournot’s profound innovativeness and continued relevance in the areas of industrial economics, mathematical economics, market competition, game theory and epistemology of probability and statistics. Each of the seven authors reminds us of the force and modernity of Cournot’s thought as a mathematician, historian of the sciences, philosopher and, not least, as an economist.
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Suggested Citation

  • Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000332
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/184 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    3. Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107, Elsevier.
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    7. Robert B. Wilson, 2021. "Strategic Analysis of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 555-561, March.
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    10. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1992. "The core in imperfectly competitive economies," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 459-483, Elsevier.
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    13. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
    14. Peleg, Bezalel, 1992. "Axiomatizations of the core," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 397-412, Elsevier.
    15. Gerard Debreu, 1963. "On a Theorem of Scarf," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
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    17. Zamir, Shmuel, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 109-154, Elsevier.
    18. Kurz, Mordecai, 1994. "Game theory and public economics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 33, pages 1153-1192, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaitanya Gokhale & Arne Traulsen, 2014. "Evolutionary Multiplayer Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 468-488, December.
    2. Esteban F. Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan, 2011. "Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000073, David K. Levine.
    3. Shijun Wang & Máté S Szalay & Changshui Zhang & Peter Csermely, 2008. "Learning and Innovative Elements of Strategy Adoption Rules Expand Cooperative Network Topologies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 3(4), pages 1-9, April.
    4. Funk, Matt, 2008. "On the Problem of Sustainable Economic Development: A Theoretical Solution to this Prisoner's Dilemma," MPRA Paper 19025, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jun 2008.
    5. Klor, Esteban F. & Kube, Sebastian & Winter, Eyal & Zultan, Ro’i, 2014. "Can higher rewards lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 72-83.
    6. Funk, Matt, 2008. "On the Problem of Vague Terms: A Glossary of Clearly Stated Assumptions & Careful, Patient, Descriptions," MPRA Paper 14505, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2013. "War Or Settlement: An Economic Analysis Of Conflcit With Endogenous And Increasing Destruction," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 23-46, February.
    8. Emerson, David & Mulley, Corinne & Bliemer, Michiel C.J., 2016. "A theoretical analysis of business models for urban public transport systems, with comparative reference to a Community Franchise involving Individual Line Ownership," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 368-378.
    9. Baruch Mevorach & Amir Horkin & Ytzhak Katz, 2014. "Periphery, professionalism and government stability in Israel’s local government," Local Economy, London South Bank University, vol. 29(6-7), pages 762-768, September.
    10. Jorge Iván González, 2016. "Sentimientos y racionalidad en economía," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Economía, edition 1, number 75.
    11. Daniel G. Arce & Todd Sandler, 2009. "Deterrence: Credibility And Proportionality," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 384-408, November.
    12. Funk, Matt, 2009. "On the Truly Noncooperative Game of Life on Earth: Darwin, Hardin, & Ostrom's Nontrivial Errors," MPRA Paper 19442, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Jorge Iván González, 2008. "Hurwicz y el juez de última instancia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 10(19), pages 115-129, July-Dece.
    14. Funk, Matt, 2008. "On the Problem of the Island of Earth: Introducing a Universal Theory of Value in an Open Letter to The President of the United States," MPRA Paper 14489, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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