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Improving bid efficiency for humanitarian food aid procurement

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  • Bagchi, Aniruddha
  • Aliyas Paul, Jomon
  • Maloni, Michael

Abstract

The competitive bid process used by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to procure food supplies and transportation services for humanitarian food aid is subject to bidder gaming that can increase prices and deter competition. Additionally, suppliers and carriers are matched after bid submission, preventing synergies from coordinated planning. Given these concerns, we determine the optimal auction mechanism to minimize gaming then justify pre-bid planning between suppliers and carriers using properties of the cost distribution functions. We operationalize these changes with a uniform price auction. The improved mechanism should deter gaming, enhance bid participation, and increase delivered food aid volumes.

Suggested Citation

  • Bagchi, Aniruddha & Aliyas Paul, Jomon & Maloni, Michael, 2011. "Improving bid efficiency for humanitarian food aid procurement," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 238-245, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:134:y:2011:i:1:p:238-245
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Meng & Kong, Zhaojun, 2023. "A two-phase combinatorial double auction and negotiation mechanism for socialized joint reserve mode in emergency preparedness," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(PA).
    2. Zhang, Meng & Kong, Zhaojun, 2022. "A multi-attribute double auction and bargaining model for emergency material procurement," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
    3. Hu, Shaolong & Dong, Zhijie Sasha & Lev, Benjamin, 2022. "Supplier selection in disaster operations management: Review and research gap identification," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(PB).
    4. V. G. Venkatesh & Abraham Zhang & Eric Deakins & Sunil Luthra & S. Mangla, 2019. "A fuzzy AHP-TOPSIS approach to supply partner selection in continuous aid humanitarian supply chains," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 283(1), pages 1517-1550, December.
    5. Paul, Jomon Aliyas & Wang, Xinfang (Jocelyn), 2015. "Robust optimization for United States Department of Agriculture food aid bid allocations," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 129-146.
    6. Gossler, Timo & Wakolbinger, Tina & Nagurney, Anna & Daniele, Patrizia, 2019. "How to increase the impact of disaster relief: A study of transportation rates, framework agreements and product distribution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(1), pages 126-141.
    7. Feyza G. Sahinyazan & Marie‐Ève Rancourt & Vedat Verter, 2021. "Improving Transportation Procurement in the Humanitarian Sector: A Data‐driven Approach for Abnormally Low Bid Detection," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(4), pages 1082-1109, April.
    8. Christian Wankmüller & Gerald Reiner, 2021. "Identifying Challenges and Improvement Approaches for More Efficient Procurement Coordination in Relief Supply Chains," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-23, February.
    9. Ertem, Mustafa A. & Buyurgan, Nebil & Pohl, Edward A., 2012. "Using announcement options in the bid construction phase for disaster relief procurement," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 306-314.

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