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Natural disasters and electoral outcomes

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  • Masiero, Giuliano
  • Santarossa, Michael

Abstract

Natural disasters are good examples of catastrophic events that may affect vote decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of earthquakes changes voters' behavior at municipal elections and which channels drive this change, focusing in particular on the role of media exposure. We exploit data from 13,338 municipal electoral cycles where incumbents seek reelection between 1993 and 2015 in Italy. We apply a difference-in-difference strategy with time and cities fixed effect to the probability of reelection and vote share using three different control groups: the universe of municipalities, a sub-sample of neighboring municipalities, and a sub-sample of municipalities identified by a one-to-one nearest-neighbor propensity score matching procedure. We find that the occurrence of destructive earthquakes significantly increases the incumbent mayors’ chance of being reelected and their vote share. We argue that this result is driven by the incumbent mayor advantage in offering recovery from disaster damages combined with a higher visibility on the media in the aftermath of the disaster. Thus, the mediatic relevance of earthquake occurrence may bias voters towards the incumbent.

Suggested Citation

  • Masiero, Giuliano & Santarossa, Michael, 2021. "Natural disasters and electoral outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:67:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020301312
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101983
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    Cited by:

    1. Buonanno, Paolo & Plevani, Giacomo & Puca, Marcello, 2023. "Earthquake hazard and civic capital," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    2. Kaustav Das & Atisha Ghosh & Pushkar Maitra, 2021. "Exogenous Shocks and Electoral Outcomes: Re-examining the Rational Voter Hypothesis," Monash Economics Working Papers 2021-13, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Ferraresi, Massimiliano & Gucciardi, Gianluca, 2022. "Political alignment, centralisation, and the sense of government unpreparedness during the COVID-19 pandemic," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Nils Braakmann & Wessel N. Vermeulen, 2023. "Do mass layoffs affect voting behaviour? Evidence from the UK," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 922-950, December.
    5. Carla Morvan & Sonia Paty, 2024. "Natural disasters and voter gratitude: What is the role of prevention policies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 427-465, March.
    6. Cerqua, Augusto & Ferrante, Chiara & Letta, Marco, 2023. "Electoral earthquake: Local shocks and authoritarian voting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    7. Pauline Avril & Gregory Levieuge & Camelia Turcu, 2023. "Do bankers want their umbrellas back when it rains? Evidence from typhoons in China," Working Papers 2023.08, International Network for Economic Research - INFER.
    8. Haruo Kondoh & Takeshi Miyazaki, 2024. "Do natural disasters affect local elections? An empirical examination using subnational electoral data," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 868-900, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Vote choice; Politician performance; Media visibility; Earthquakes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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