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Political alignment, centralisation, and the sense of government unpreparedness during the COVID-19 pandemic

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  • Ferraresi, Massimiliano
  • Gucciardi, Gianluca

Abstract

We rely on a periodic public opinion poll indicator of the performance of mayors collected for 103 large cities in Italy and in three waves (2015, 2017, and 2020) to examine whether and to what extent the exogenous shift in policy-making decisions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic has affected citizens' perceptions regarding attributions of responsibility. We leverage the variation in political alignment between central and local governments and implement a difference-in-differences research design, finding that when decisions are fully centralised (during the lockdown), voter approval for the mayor of an aligned city decreases by around 7%. Further analyses suggest that our results are more marked (i) during pre-electoral years and (ii) in cities with a lower level of social capital. Lastly, we document that the decrease in the approval ratings of aligned mayors is entirely guided by cities not severely hit by the pandemic, thereby reflecting a sense of ‘discontent’ in these areas for the policy decisions adopted by the central government to tackle the pandemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferraresi, Massimiliano & Gucciardi, Gianluca, 2022. "Political alignment, centralisation, and the sense of government unpreparedness during the COVID-19 pandemic," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:73:y:2022:i:c:s017626802100118x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102144
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    Cited by:

    1. Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza & Gholipour, Hassan F., 2023. "COVID-19 fatalities and internal conflict: Does government economic support matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy outcomes; Voter perception; Policy-making process; Centralisation; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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