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Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces

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  • Carmona, Guilherme

Abstract

We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large but finite number of players that allows compact metric spaces for both actions and types. We then compare our framework and findings to the early purification theorems of Rashid (1983. Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: asymptotic results. Economics Letters 12, 7-10), Cartwright and Wooders (2002 On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. University of Warwick Working Paper 686 (revised 2005)), Kalai (2004. Large robust games. Econometrica 72, 1631-1665) and Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2006. Behavioral conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior 57, 347-360). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmona, Guilherme, 2008. "Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1302-1311, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:44:y:2008:i:12:p:1302-1311
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2009. "On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(1), pages 127-136, March.
    2. Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Behavioral conformity in games with many players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 347-360, November.
    3. Starr, Ross M, 1969. "Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 25-38, January.
    4. Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 215-219, November.
    5. Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
    6. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Jian, 2022. "A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    2. Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2012. "Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 418-430.
    3. Noguchi, Mitsunori, 2010. "Large but finite games with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 191-213, March.
    4. Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer, 2010. "Partial exposure in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 602-613, March.
    5. Yaron Azrieli & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Lipschitz Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(2), pages 350-357, May.
    6. M. Ali Khan & Kali P. Rath, 2011. "The Shapley-Folkman Theorem and the Range of a Bounded Measure: An Elementary and Unified Treatment," Economics Working Paper Archive 586, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    7. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2016. "Strict Nash equilibria in non-atomic games with strict single crossing in players (or types) and actions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 95-109, April.

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