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Effects of Protocol of Play and Social Orientation on Behavior in Sequential Resource Dilemmas

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  • Budescu, David V.
  • Au, Wing Tung
  • Chen, Xiao-Ping

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  • Budescu, David V. & Au, Wing Tung & Chen, Xiao-Ping, 1997. "Effects of Protocol of Play and Social Orientation on Behavior in Sequential Resource Dilemmas," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 179-193, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:69:y:1997:i:3:p:179-193
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dawes, Robyn M & Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 187-197, Summer.
    2. Budescu, David V. & Suleiman, Ramzi & Rapoport, Amnon, 1995. "Positional Order and Group Size Effects in Resource Dilemmas with Uncertain Resources," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 225-238, March.
    3. Roy Gardner & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, July.
    4. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    5. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
    6. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Samuelson, Charles D. & Allison, Scott T., 1994. "Cognitive Factors Affecting the Use of Social Decision Heuristics in Resource-Sharing Tasks," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, April.
    8. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
    9. Samuelson, Charles D. & Messick, David M., 1986. "Alternative structural solutions to resource dilemmas," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 139-155, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Marc Knez, 2004. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 25-48, February.
    2. Charles A. Holt & Cathleen A. Johnson & Courtney A. Mallow & Sean P. Sullivan, 2012. "Water Externalities: Tragedy of the Common Canal," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1142-1162, April.
    3. Abele, Susanne & Bless, Herbert & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2004. "Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 28-46, January.
    4. Ramzi Suleiman, 2022. "Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-21, April.
    5. Abele, Susanne & Stasser, Garold, 2007. "Continuous and step-level pay-off functions in public good games : a conceptual analysis," Papers 07-72, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    6. Abele, S.C. & Stasser, G., 2005. "Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-015-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    7. Tong, Kwok-kit & Leung, Kwok, 2002. "Tournament as a motivational strategy: Extension to dynamic situations with uncertain duration," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 399-420, June.
    8. Holt, Charles A. & Johnson, Cathleen & Mallow, Courtney & Sullivan, Sean P., 2010. "Tragedy of the common canal," MPRA Paper 20838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Astrid Hopfensitz & César Mantilla & Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2019. "Catch Uncertainty and Reward Schemes in a Commons Dilemma: An Experimental Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(4), pages 1121-1153, April.
    10. Chen, Xiao-Ping & Bachrach, Daniel G., 2003. "Tolerance of free-riding: The effects of defection size, defection pattern, and social orientation in a repeated public goods dilemma," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 139-147, January.
    11. Ramzi Suleiman, 2017. "Economic Harmony: An Epistemic Theory of Economic Interactions," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(1), pages 1-15, January.

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