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Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games

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  • Abele, S.C.
  • Stasser, G.

Abstract

We will firstly outline the rationale of a public good game and explain the distinction between a continuous public good game and a threshold public good game. As a vast majority of experimental research in social psychology on public good games has used threshold public good games, we will then outline the structure of a dilemma game with a provision point. Our point is that dilemma games with a provision point violate two important assumptions commonly held for public good games: a) there is always a conflict between the group’s interest and the individual’s interest; and b) an individual is always better off defecting. A threshold dilemma game is a dilemma with a coordination game embedded in it. Hence it provides focal point solutions and may as a consequence leave less room for other factors to affect behavior. Moreover, games with a provision point might yield different results than games without a provision point. We will argue that above that threshold dilemma games do not provide good models of many the public goods problems that are encountered in real life. We will propose that a public good game with a tilted S function provides a more appropriate model of real life dilemmas while fulfilling the defining properties of public good games.

Suggested Citation

  • Abele, S.C. & Stasser, G., 2005. "Continuous versus Step-Level Public Good Games," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-015-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:1937
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
    2. Budescu, David V. & Suleiman, Ramzi & Rapoport, Amnon, 1995. "Positional Order and Group Size Effects in Resource Dilemmas with Uncertain Resources," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 225-238, March.
    3. Budescu, David V. & Au, Wing Tung & Chen, Xiao-Ping, 1997. "Effects of Protocol of Play and Social Orientation on Behavior in Sequential Resource Dilemmas," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 179-193, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuiying Deng & Tianguang Chu, 2011. "Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation through Darwinian Dynamics in Public Goods Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(10), pages 1-9, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    continuous public good game; step-level public good game;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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