Social information processing in strategic decision-making: Why timing matters
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- Declerck, Carolyn H. & Kiyonari, Toko & Boone, Christophe, 2009. "Why do responders reject unequal offers in the Ultimatum Game? An experimental study on the role of perceiving interdependence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 335-343, June.
- Abele, Susanne & Stasser, Garold & Chartier, Christopher, 2014. "Use of social knowledge in tacit coordination: Social focal points," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 23-33.
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